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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE.APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Ascencio, Rufino Facility: WoodboU!I).e CF 
NY SID: Appeal 
Control No.: 
12-121-18 B 
DIN: 94-A-3811 · 
Appearances: Rufino Asencio 94A3811 
Woodboume Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 1000 
Woodboume, New York 12788 
Decision appealed: December 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Drake, Berliner, Shapiro 
who participated:· 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived February 4, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Commissioner 
~med 
~ed 
ed determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ .Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
1his Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te fi dings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ' ~ 't:'l ·t.; . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole Flle - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
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     Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board failed to mention CPDO in their 
decision. 3) a finding of release is incompatible with the welfare of society is void, as appellant 
has a deportation order, and the Board is prohibited from considering this factor for other countries. 
4) the decision lacks detail. 5) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 6) 
the Board ignored the wishes of the sentencing court and illegally resentenced him. 7) the decision 
lacks future guidance. 8) the decision violated his constitutional liberty interest in early release. 9) 
the decision was the same as prior decisions. 10)  the Board failed to comply with the 2011 
amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was ignored, and the statutes are now 
future focused. Also, the Board stating it departed from the COMPAS due to alleged disingenuous 
account of the crime is void. 11) the 18 month hold is excessive. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
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      The Board placing particular emphasis on the  callous nature of the offense does not demonstrate 
irrationality bordering on impropriety. Olmosperez v Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 
N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). 
 
   Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also considered 
other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  
Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 
65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
    The Board may take note of the inmate’s disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v 
Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). 
     The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of 
Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter 
of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
     Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider  the 
inmate’s capacity to tell the truth, and how this impacts on the statutory factors. Siao-Pao v 
Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept. 2008). 
     As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the 
same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, then it follows that the same aspects 
of the individual’s record may again  constitute the primary grounds for the denial of parole. Hakim 
v Travis,  302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Nelson v New York State Parole Board,  
274 A.D.2d 719, 711 N.Y.S.2d 792 (3d Dept 2000); Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 
795 (3d Dept 2002). Per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board is required to consider the 
same factors each time he appears in front of them.  Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 
70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept. 2010) lv.den. 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143. 
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
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Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 
2005).That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty 
interest in parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 
883, 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d 
Dept. 1997). 
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      Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     The existence of a final deportation order does not require an inmate’s release, but is merely one 
factor to consider.  Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Lackwood v. New York State Div. of Parole, 127 A.D.3d 1495, 8 N.Y.S.3d 461 
(3d Dept. 2015); People ex rel. Borrell v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 85 A.D.3d 1515, 925 
N.Y.S.2d 922 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 17 N.Y.3d 718, 936 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2011); Matter of Samuel v. 
Alexander, 69 A.D.3d 861, 892 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2d Dept. 2010).  “Although the Board's 
determination did not specifically reference the deportation order, the Board plainly was aware of 
its existence and, in any event, was ‘not required to assign equal weight to or discuss every factor 
it considered in making its determination.’”  Matter of Abbas v. New York State Division of 
Parole, 61 A.D.3d 1228, 877 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dept. 2009). Although appellant met the statutory 
criteria for CPDO eligibility, such eligibility, as noted is only one factor to be considered in 
granting parole under Executive Law §259-i(2)(d).  Eligibility does not equate to entitlement for 
parole release or preclude consideration of the usual factors in the Executive Law relevant to 
making that decision per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c). The Parole Board still has its discretion. 
Ortiz v. State Board of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 52, 668 N.Y.S.2d 823 (4th Dept. 1998); leave denied 
92 N.Y.2d 811, 680 N.Y.S.2d 457; Oyekoya v New York State Department of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 
960, 714 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dept 2000); Hunter v New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 
1178, 800 N.Y.S.2d 799 (3d Dept 2005); Borrell v New York State Board of Parole, 85 A.D.3d 
1515, 925 N.Y.S.2d 922(3d Dept. 2011) lv.app.den. 17 N.Y.3d 718, 936 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2011). The 
Board asking about re-entry plans if not deported doesn’t negate the Board’s knowledge of the 
deportation order. Del Rosario v Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     The use of the language about the welfare of society doesn’t mean the Board is overstepping 
its jurisdiction into that of another country.  Many inmates who were deported have returned to 
the U.S. illegally. 
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
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Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
         Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 
2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase 
transparency in the final decision. 
      Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 Amendment and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
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Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
      
     And the departure from the COMPAS was in compliance with the regulations, for as was 
previously cited, appellant’s credibility and capacity to tell the truth may be considered by the 
Board. Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the Board need not explicitly mention each factor considered.  
Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).  
While the Board’s amended regulation reinforces that detailed reasons must be given for a denial of 
release, it did not alter this well-established principle.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Courts must defer 
to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary 
nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board of 18 months will not 
be disturbed.   Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 
163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 
(Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold).   
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
